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Abstract: Exchange Rate Flexibility across Financial Crises 
Virginie Coudert, Cécile Couharde, Valérie Mignon 
 
This paper studies the impact of global financial turmoil on the exchange rate policies in emerging 
countries. Many emerging countries have loosened the link of their currencies to the US dollar since 
the bursting of the subprime crisis in July 2007. Spillovers from advanced financial markets to 
currencies in emerging countries stem from the same causes documented in the literature on 
contagion, such as the drying–up of investors’ liquidity, the rise in risk aversion, and the updating of 
their risk assessments. Consequently, interdependencies across currencies are likely to be exacerbated 
during crisis periods. To test this hypothesis, we assess the exchange rate policies by their degree of 
flexibility, itself proxied by the exchange rate volatility, and investigate their relationship to a global 
financial stress indicator, measured by the volatility on global markets. We introduce the possibility 
of non-linearities by running smooth transition regressions (STR) over a sample of 21 emerging 
countries from January 1994 to September 2009. The results confirm that exchange rate flexibility 
does increase more than proportionally with the global financial stress, for most countries in the 
sample. We also evidence regional contagion effects spreading from one emerging currency to other 
currencies in the neighboring area. 
 
Key Words: Financial crises, dollar pegs, contagion effects, nonlinearity. 
 
 
 
 
Résumé: La flexibilité des taux de change à travers les crises financières 
Virginie Coudert, Cécile Couharde, Valérie Mignon 
 
Cet article étudie l’impact de la crise financière mondiale sur les politiques de change dans les pays 
émergents. Un grand nombre de pays émergents ont relâché leur lien avec le dollar depuis le début de 
la crise financière de juillet 2007. L’assèchement de la liquidité et la réévaluation du risque de la part 
des investisseurs se sont traduits par des tensions se manifestant d’abord sur les marchés financiers 
des pays industrialisés ; elles ont ensuite atteint les devises des pays émergents suivant un phénomène 
de contagion bien décrit dans la littérature. Cette contagion expliquerait la similitude observée dans 
l’évolution d’un certain nombre de devises émergentes. Afin de tester cette hypothèse, nous mesurons 
les politiques de change par leur degré de flexibilité, lui même approximé par la volatilité des taux de 
change pour un ensemble de pays émergents, et étudions leur lien avec divers indicateurs de tension 
sur les marchés financiers mondiaux. Nous testons en particulier l’existence de non linéarités en 
estimant des modèles à changement de régime (STR) sur un échantillon de 21 pays émergents sur la 
période allant de janvier 1994 à septembre 2009. Les résultats obtenus confirment que la flexibilité 
des taux de change augmente plus que proportionnellement avec le degré de tension sur les marchés 
financiers pour la plupart des pays de notre échantillon. Nous mettons également en évidence des 
effets de contagion régionale entre les marchés des changes des pays appartenant à une même zone 
géographique. 
 
Mots-clés : crises financières, ancrage au dollar, effets de contagion, non-linéarité. 
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Introduction1 
 
Most currencies in the world are more or less linked to the dollar (USD) or the euro (EUR), 
even if very few of them have strictly fixed exchange rates. This phenomenon has been well-
documented, especially since the pioneer papers by Reinhart (2000) and Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002). Up to now, the use of the EUR as an anchor currency has been confined to Europe, its 
immediate vicinity and some African countries (ECB, 2008). This leaves the rest of the world 
to the USD influence, especially Central and South America, emerging and less developed 
Asia, and the Middle-East. The broadness of this area makes the issue very important to the 
world economy. The long-lasting prevalence of the USD as an anchor currency,2 which 
follows on from the Bretton Woods period, may seem puzzling, since countries are now free 
to set their own arrangements. Various reasons have been extensively discussed in the 
economic literature, such as externality gains from existing networks (Aglietta and Deusy-
Fournier, 1995; Hartman, 1998; Goldberg and Tille, 2008); the high liquidity of the US 
financial markets (Longstaff, 2004; Forbes, 2008); emerging countries’ anxiety to protect 
their export-led economy (Dooley et al., 2003) or the US huge external deficit which mirrors 
the expansion of US forex reserves in emerging countries (Eichengreen, 2004; Gourinchas 
and Rey, 2007). 
 
Nevertheless, the key role of the USD in the international monetary system has been more and 
more challenged for several years and some evolution has begun to take shape, especially 
since the start of the present financial crisis. Many countries have loosened the link of their 
currency to the USD in the global financial crisis that started in July 2007, either because they 
have been pushed into this strategy by market pressures, or for tactical reasons. Looking back 
at the main global crises, we find that ruptures of pegs have been often concentrated in those 
episodes. Rationales for this may be found in the literature on contagion across markets.  
 
Contagion effects involved in currency crises have been closely scrutinized, especially in the 
aftermath of the 1997 Asian crisis (Masson, 1998; Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1999; 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000). They have also been extensively documented in the economic 
literature, as they are key factors to understand financial crises (for a survey, see Allen and 
Gale, 2000; Pericoli and Sbracia, 2003). Actually, most channels of contagion described in 
this literature can be applied to the transmission of a crisis in advanced financial markets 
spreading out to emerging currency markets. Firstly, contagion can stem from a drying-up of 
investors’ liquidity. After a sharp price fall in a major market, investors have to cope with a 
reduction of wealth and tend to withdraw their funds from other risky assets. As they all do it 
simultaneously, this results in firesale prices spreading the crisis over (Schinasi and Smith 
2001; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2004; Caramazza et al., 2004). Banks’ liabilities overlapping 
across countries, convergence trading (Kyle and Xiong, 2001; Xiong, 2001), margin calls 
(Calvo, 1999), risk management tools such as value-at-risk (Persaud, 2000), and marked to 
market valuations (Adrian and Shin, 2008), all contribute to tightening liquidity constraints in 
case of crisis and to spark capital repatriation from emerging markets as well as a decline in 
bank loans. Secondly, a crisis can act as a “wake-up call”, as investors tend to revise their 
judgments and preferences after its burst, especially on assets issued by countries of the same 
region. They suddenly see other financial assets as more risky than before, which can set off a 
“flight to quality” (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2005, 2007). As well, their risk appetite is 
                                                 
1. We would like to thank Agnès Bénassy-Quéré, Gunther Capelle-Blancard, Mathieu Gex, Antonia Lopez-
Villavicencio and Anne Péguin-Feissolle for helpful comments and suggestions. 
2. See Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2006) among others. 
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likely to drop (Kumar and Persaud, 2002), which is confirmed by empirical studies (Coudert 
and Gex, 2008). Thirdly, the rise in uncertainty during a crisis paves the way to herding 
behavior (for a survey, see Bickchandani and Sharma, 2000). This may be due to asymmetric 
information (Kodres and Pritsker, 2002), or to the compensation plans of portfolio managers 
(Chakravorti and Lall, 2004).  
 
Two additional strands of reasons may also explain the ruptures of pegs under global financial 
strains. Firstly, there is a policy issue at stake for emerging countries’ governments that may 
choose to update their exchange rate policy in time of crises. Admittedly, they are likely to be 
pushed to do so by market pressures. Nevertheless, governments can also go for greater 
flexibility in their exchange rate policy in order to boost their competitiveness and sustain 
their ailing exports. This may be a policy response to the decrease in their foreign exchange 
receipts. They can also be led to this choice by following their neighbors’ strategies, which is 
utterly rationale. This kind of effect could have been at stake in the 1997 Asian crises. Even if 
most countries had no choice but to let their currencies depreciate under the fire of speculative 
attacks, it could also have been a rational strategy for them.. This argument is particularly 
relevant in the case of Asian countries. As they tend to trade more and more between 
themselves, it could be rationale for them to consider a common currency. This common 
currency has been the dollar for several decades, leading McKinnon (2000) to talk of an 
“Asian Dollar Standard”. But the situation could change, especially because the trade links of 
these countries have loosened with the United States in parallel to their increasing integration 
(Kwack, 2004).  
 
A second strand of reasons stems from the fact that some currencies are seen as safe-havens 
during crises. This is the case for the yen and the Swiss franc (Ranaldo and Söderlind, 2007),  
but also probably for the USD in the immediate aftermath of the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers in late 2008 (McCauley and McGuire, 2009). More fundamentally, these movements 
stem from the carry-trade strategies developed during the tranquil periods which build huge 
long-positions on risky currencies, whereas accumulating short-positions on low-interest 
currencies such as the yen and the Swiss franc (Lustig et al., 2007; Burnside et al., 2008). 
These carry trades suddenly unwind during crises (Kohler, 2010), sparking violent 
depreciation in high-interest currencies such as those of emerging countries.   
   
In this paper, we try to address these issues by answering the following questions: (i) Have 
exchange rate policies been modified in the sense of a greater flexibility since the start of the 
financial turmoil in July 2007? (ii) Is this evolution in line with what happened during 
previous crises? All the rationales mentioned above point to a positive answer to these 
questions. More generally, we aim at investigating the linkages between currency markets in 
emerging countries and financial market strains in the global economy. We expect that the co-
movements between these two types of markets are exacerbated in episodes of financial 
turmoil.  
 
To check these hypotheses more precisely, we start by measuring the exchange rate policies 
by their degree of flexibility, which itself is proxied by the volatility of the exchange rates for 
a sample of emerging countries. In this respect, we follow the spirit of the works done by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Ilzetzki et al. (2008). Then, we study the relationships 
between currency flexibility and various proxies for stress on global financial markets. This 
boils down to testing the volatility spillovers from advanced financial markets to emerging 
currency markets. The transmission of volatility may be a normal phenomenon in globalized 
markets, but can also take on abnormal turns during episodes of financial stress, which is a 
  
9
typical symptom of “contagion”. Contagion effects can be evidenced empirically by different 
methods (for a survey see Dungey et al., 2004), although it is difficult to disentangle the 
precise channels at stake. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) insist on the rupture in the usual 
interdependence mechanisms between markets during a crisis. These disrupted links can be 
captured by different ways and most of them involve acknowledging nonlinearities in the 
transmission channels. Favero and Giavazzi (2000) introduce dummy variables for outliers in 
a VAR model. Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995, 1996) also rely on dummy variables 
linked to the pressures on the exchange market. Some works have focused on co-movements 
when asset returns are extreme (Bae et al., 2003; Hartman et al., 2004). 
 
In parallel, some studies have been devoted to the transmission of stress of advanced 
countries to emerging markets. In their review of the literature, Dungey et al. (2004) consider 
advanced countries financial stance as a “common factor” affecting emerging countries in 
most models, not as a factor of contagion in itself. Diebold and Yilmaz (2008) use a variance 
decomposition in a VAR model containing 19 equity markets to assess the spillovers across 
countries. Balakrishnam et al. (2009) construct an indicator of the financial stress put on 
emerging countries by combining measures on several markets. They find that this indicator 
co-moves with the financial stress in the advanced countries and that the degree of co-
movements varies across countries according to their financial linkages, although 
vulnerability factors also play a role.  
 
Here, we want to assess volatility spillovers by testing for possible nonlinearities. Indeed, 
strains in global financial markets are likely to affect exchange rates in emerging markets 
more badly when they reached high degrees. We verify that hypothesis by running smooth 
transition regressions (STR) and testing for nonlinearities over a sample of 21 emerging 
countries during the period from January 1994 to September 2009. We represent stress on 
financial markets by different indicators. One popular candidate for this role is the VIX, the 
CBOE Volatility Index, which stands for the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index. We also 
consider other indicators, based on the realized volatility of different market indexes, as well 
as indicators standing for emerging markets as a whole.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and compares 
exchange rate and financial market volatilities around crisis episodes. Relying on the 
estimation of STR models, Section 3 assesses the relationships between global financial stress 
and emerging currency volatility. Section 4 is devoted to the study of regional contagion 
effects within the emerging countries by testing whether the intensity of such effects differs 
across crisis and non-crisis periods. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
1. Data for assessing currency flexibility and global financial 
stress 
 
1.1. Exchange rates 
 
The sample period spans from January 1994 to September 2009, on a monthly periodicity. It 
includes 21 currencies of emerging countries; in Latin America: those of Argentina (ARS), 
Brazil (BRL), Chile (CLP), Colombia (COP), Mexico (MXN), Peru (PEN), Uruguay (UYU), 
Venezuela (VEB); in Asia: those of China (CNY), Indonesia (IDR), India (INR), Korea 
(KRW), Malaysia (MYR), Philippines (PHP), Singapore (SGD), Thailand (THB); in the 
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Middle East: those of Israel (ILS), Kuwait (KWD), Morocco (MAD). We also add the 
Russian ruble (RUB) and the South African rand (ZAR).  
 
This set of currencies matches the main emerging countries in the traditional dollar zones of 
influence, which are Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. We have deliberately left out 
emerging Europe and North Africa, as the link of their currencies to the euro could have 
disturbed the interpretation of the results. Consequently, all the currencies in the sample were 
more or less linked to the USD over the period under review, at least for some time (for a 
complete description of the exchange rates regimes of these countries, see Ilzetzki et al., 
2008). This justifies our calculations on exchange rates against USD. The later are taken from 
Bloomberg. We alternatively consider real exchange rates to account for exchange rate 
regimes aimed at stabilizing real exchange rates, such as crawling pegs and some managed 
floats. Indeed, most Latin American countries were experiencing a crawling peg sometime or 
another in the sample. It was the case for Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay 
and Venezuela. Other countries were having managed floats aimed at stabilizing their real 
exchange rate, such as Russia, Israel and India. Real exchange rates are calculated by 
deflating the exchange rate by the consumer price index (CPI), extracted from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics database. 
 
1.2. Indicators for global financial stress 
 
Financial stress is represented by different indicators gauging the volatility of financial 
markets; all series being extracted from Bloomberg. (i) First, we consider the VIX, which is 
the most popular gauge for financial strains; it measures the implied volatility of the S&P500 
index options for the next 30 days, calculated by the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
(CBOE) (see Whaley, 2008; Becker et al., 2009). All other indicators are realized volatility 
that we calculate as squared returns. (ii) We consider the world MSCI (denoted as MSCI_W), 
which is the stock index calculated by Morgan Stanley Capital International made up of 1500 
stocks in the developed countries. (iii) Financial strains on emerging markets are captured by 
the same type of stock index but for emerging countries (denoted as MSCI_EM), and by the 
emerging markets bond index calculated by JP. Morgan (EMBI). (iv) As most of the sample 
countries are commodity producers, we also consider two commodity indices: the CRB, 
calculated by the Commodity Research Bureau, and the S&P GSCI, the commodity index 
published by Standard and Poors’ and Goldman Sachs. We consider the two indices, since 
their weighing of commodities is quite different, the weight on oil being very high for the 
S&P GSCI and lower for the CRB. 
 
 On the whole, we consider the volatility of six financial market indicators:  
• two for the developed stock markets: the VIX and the MSCI_W,  
• two for the emerging markets: the MSCI_EM and the EMBI, 
• two for commodity markets: the CRB and the S&P GSCI. 
 
1.3. Method for measuring the degree of currency flexibility 
 
We measure currency flexibility through the volatility of the exchange rates. This choice is 
justified by a number of empirical works that have been carried out to identify exchange rate 
regimes (Reinhart, 2000; Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2003, 
2005; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Ilzetzki et al., 2008). All these studies have relied on 
exchange rate volatility to identify the flexibility of exchange rates. More precisely, the older 
studies considered three variables: exchange rate changes, changes in forex reserves and 
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interest rates (Reinhart, 2000; Calvo and Reinhart, 2000). Then, Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2003, 2005) only used the first two ones, leaving out the interest rate. The most 
recent research has only focused on the changes in exchange rates, which suggests that the 
information given by the other variables may be redundant (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; 
Ilzetzki et al., 2008). That is why we consider here that the exchange rate volatility is a good 
gauge for flexibility.   
 
We measure the volatility of exchange rates ( )2tσ  against USD (nominal or real) by two ways: 
the squared monthly returns of exchange rates (in logarithms) and through the estimation of a 
GARCH model (the mean equation including only a constant term). We only retain the 
squared returns in all the following results for several reasons: (i) results are very close for the 
two measures of volatility; (ii) they are more straightforward to interpret; (iii) they do not 
require any prior calculations of parameters, which may increase the uncertainty on the 
coefficients estimated in regressions. The same calculations are used to calculate the volatility 
of other financial markets.3 In the next section, volatility figures are annualized and expressed 
in percentages. 
 
1.4. Exchange rate flexibility during the crisis periods  
 
We now take a look at the volatility data in order to check their evolution around several 
crisis episodes. Figure A1 in the Appendix displays the evolutions in volatility of the nominal 
exchange rate against the USD for the considered countries over the sample period. 
Unsurprisingly, these volatilities are characterized by sharp peaks, especially when 
currencies’ pegs are suddenly broken. Periods of increased volatilities can also be spotted in 
the aftermath of main crisis episodes.  
 
Firstly, we check that major turmoils in advanced financial markets give rise to more 
exchange rate flexibility in emerging countries.4 To do that, we compare the currency 
volatility before and after the subprime crisis that burst in July 2007 (Figure 1). We take a 
large window both (i) before the crisis—January 2004-June 2007—as this period is often 
considered as a tranquil episode on financial markets, characterized by low volatility and low 
spreads, and (ii) after it—July 2007-September 2009—as when we wrote the paper, the crisis 
was not over. Results show that this crisis did trigger a surge in currency volatility for all 
countries but one (Venezuela). Indeed, most countries have loosened the link of their 
currencies to the USD after the crisis, especially Brazil, Chile, Korea, Mexico and Russia. 
Note that the depreciation that hit some of these currencies at the start of the crisis, 
subsequently reversed to an appreciation in a number of cases (such as Brazil); so the surge in 
volatility does not necessarily mean depreciation. Venezuela managed to keep its hard peg to 
the USD throughout the crisis, thanks to its tight capital controls. China also tightened its 
currency peg to the USD, fearing that a depreciation of the dollar would yield losses in its 
huge forex reserves as well as a loss in its export competitiveness.  
 
                                                 
3. Note that all our series of volatility are stationary, as indicated by the results of standard unit root tests 
(available upon request to the authors). 
4. Our aim in this section is not to identify all crises, but just to provide some stylized facts. For instance, we do 
not study the LTCM or the Dot-com crises, which were very near the Asian and Argentinean crises, respectively.   
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Figure 1. Exchange rate volatility around the subprime crisis, annualized in % 
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Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Bloomberg data. 
 
Secondly, we consider the effects of two major currency crises that occurred over the period: 
the 1997 Asian and the 2002 Argentinean crises. We select these particular episodes, because 
each of them brought about strains on world financial markets across the board. Volatilities 
are calculated with a one-year window before and after the crisis (Figures 2 and 3). The Asian 
crisis brought about a surge in currency flexibility mainly in South-Asia (Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand), although some subdued spillovers were also felt 
as far as Latin America (Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru). The collapse of Argentina’s 
currency board in 2002 also resulted in an increase in exchange rate volatility, mainly 
confined to the neighboring countries (Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, Venezuela).  
 
Figure 2. Exchange rate volatility around the Asian crisis, annualized in % 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Bloomberg data. 
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Figure 3. Exchange rate volatility around the Argentinean crisis, annualized in % 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Bloomberg data. 
 
On the whole, these figures illustrate that major crises generate large volatility spillovers. 
Firstly, the subprime crisis has spread over to all countries considered in our sample (but one). 
This confirms results by studies analyzing aggregate financial stress indices (Balakrishnan et 
al., 2009) and volatility spillover index (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2008). Increased linkages 
among global financial markets and greater mobility of capital are certainly at stake in this 
worldwide dimension of the crisis. Secondly, currency crises in emerging markets, such as the 
Asian and the Argentinean crises, triggered more regional contagion than global effects, even 
if they threatened the whole financial system. Fewer countries were involved, although for 
those that were hit, the exchange rate volatility soared more sharply than in the present crisis. 5 
These preliminary results lead us to consider two types of effects that crises may yield on 
emerging countries’ currencies: (i) the impact of the global financial crises, born in advanced 
countries (Section 3); (ii) the regional contagion due to currency crises in other emerging 
countries (Section 4). 
 
1.5. Financial market volatility during the crises  
 
We now take a look at the volatility of our indicators of global financial markets, which will 
act as proxies for global financial stress (Figure A2 in the Appendix). Unsurprisingly, the 
volatility sharply increased at the end of the period, following the subprime crisis. Figure 4 
compares volatility around the same crisis episodes as previously. The subprime crisis 
triggered a surge in volatility for all our indicators across the board, in developed and 
emerging markets as well as for commodity indices. The Asian crisis also brought about a rise 
in volatility on all markets, except for commodities, its impact being particularly strong on 
emerging stock markets. The effect of the Argentinean crisis on global markets was more 
subdued, although it did trigger a rise in emerging market bond spreads.  
 
                                                 
5. We have performed a comparison test to check if the results are significantly different between the two sub-
samples—before and after the turmoil—for each considered crisis (detailed results available upon request to the 
authors). For the subprime crisis, the difference is significant for all countries, except China, Thailand and 
Venezuela. Regarding Argentinean and Asian crises, volatility series before and after the crisis are significantly 
different for most South American and East Asian countries.  
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Figure 4. Volatility of global financial markets indicators around three crisis episodes6 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Bloomberg data 
 
 
2. Relationship between currency flexibility and global financial 
stress 
 
As illustrated in the previous section, the relationship between the global financial stress and 
the degree of exchange rate flexibility is expected to be positive. However, one may wonder 
about the time variation of the intensity of this link and, more generally, about the linearity of 
this relationship. Indeed, our aim is to investigate whether the link between exchange rate 
flexibility and global financial stress is higher during crisis episodes. In other words, we 
examine if a high degree of stress in global financial markets is likely to have a proportionally 
higher impact on the exchange rate flexibility than a weak degree. This non-linear impact is 
due to the fact that financial market strains are able to spark investors’ “flight to quality” 
and/or a deliberate softening of exchange rate policies in emerging countries, only when they 
reach a certain level, whereas their impact is much weaker in normal times. 
 
2.1. Methodology 
 
To assess this potential nonlinear relationship, we rely on the smooth transition regressions 
framework. In these models, two regimes characterized the dynamics of the exchange rate 
flexibility—low and high volatility—, the transition from one regime to the other being 
smooth. As recalled by Baele (2003) among others, such regime-switching models are 
preferable to the use of dummy variables to investigate the impact of some particular events. 
Indeed, the dates used for dummy variables may be uncertain since such events may have 
been long anticipated, or may need time to become effective. Regime-switching models do 
not have these drawbacks since series are allowed to switch endogenously from one regime to 
the other, depending on the value of an (observable) transition variable. It is, therefore, not 
imposed a priori. 
                                                 
6. All variables are annualized volatility in % of the corresponding market indices, except for the VIX, which is 
taken in level. 
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Since we are interested in the bivariate link between the volatility of the exchange rate and the 
stress on the global financial markets, we consider here a simple specification in which only 
one explanatory variable is retained, this variable being identical to the transition variable 
proxying the stress on financial markets.7 Let 2tσ  be the degree of exchange rate flexibility 
measured as the volatility of the exchange rate, the later being proxied by the squared returns 
of the considered exchange rate series. The smooth transition regression (STR) model of order 
p that we consider is given by: 
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where tε  is ( )2,0 εσiid , st is the transition variable and ( )csg t ,;γ  is the transition function 
which by convention is bounded by zero and one. 0>γ  denotes the speed of transition from 
one regime to the other, and c is the threshold parameter.  
In order to catch possible real effects, we also run Equation (1) in real terms:  
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where 2Rtσ  stands for the volatility of real exchange rates. This formulation accounts for 
crawling pegs and managed floats aimed at stabilizing real exchange rates. It also allows us to 
correct for high inflation periods in some countries and for the heterogeneity in the inflation 
rates in the sample. 
 
In this model, the economy can be in two states, representing two degrees of exchange rate 
flexibility: low and high volatility. The transition between these two regimes is smooth, so 
there exists a continuum of states between extreme regimes. Two transition functions are 
commonly considered (Teräsvirta and Anderson, 1992): 
 
• ( ) ( )( )( ) 1exp1,; −−−+= cscsg tt γγ  : logistic STR model (LSTR) 
 
• ( ) ( )( )2exp1,; cscsg tt −−−= γγ  : exponential STR model (ESTR) 
 
In the LSTR specification, the economy evolves between two regimes characterized by 
different dynamics, the transition from one regime to the other being smooth. This 
specification accounts for asymmetric realizations, in the sense that the two regimes are 
associated with small and large values of the transition variable relative to the threshold value. 
Turning to the ESTR specification, the two regimes have similar structures—meaning that  
                                                 
7. As noticed, we consider here a simple bivariate framework since our main objective is to put forward the 
existence of nonlinearities in the links between the exchange rate volatility and the global financial stress. Of 
course, if the main objective is to rely on the exchange rate crisis literature, this analysis can be extended to a 
multivariate case to account for various control variables. 
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increases and reductions of the transition variable have similar dynamics8—but the middle 
grounds are characterized by different dynamics. In both cases—LSTR and ESTR—when γ 
goes to zero, the STR process reduces to a linear model. When γ tends to infinity, the LSTR 
model becomes a two-regime threshold model with abrupt transition (Tong, 1990). This is not 
the case for the ESTR model which also becomes linear when the speed of transition goes to 
infinity. To recover the threshold model as a special case of the ESTR specification, we 
follow Jansen and Teräsvirta (1996) by writing the ESTR model such as: 
 
( ) ( )( )( )( ) 121exp1,; −−−−+= cscscsg ttt γγ      (2) 
 
with 21 cc ≤  and ( )', 21 ccc = . When γ goes to infinity and if 21 cc ≠ , we have: ( ) 1,; =csg t γ  
for 1cst <  and 2cst > , and ( ) 0,; =csg t γ  for 21 csc t ≤≤ . In this case, the ESTR model with 
Equation (2) as the transition function allows recovering a three-regime threshold model with 
abrupt transition as a special case—the two extreme regimes being similar. 
 
To specify the STR model, we follow the methodology proposed by Teräsvirta (1994) 
consisting of three steps: 
 
• Specification of the linear model. This step consists in specifying the linear autoregressive 
part of the model (i.e. determining p in Equations (1) and (1’)) and selecting the transition 
variable. To this end, we use the Schwarz information criterion.9 
 
• Test of linearity and choice of the transition variable. We test for the null hypothesis of 
linearity against the STR alternative by running the following auxiliary regression 
(Luukkonen et al., 1988): 
 
∑
=
++=
3
1
0
2 ~''
j
t
j
ttjtt szz ηθθσ       (3) 
 
where ( )'~,1 tt zz = , tz~  being the vector containing the explanatory variable and the lagged 
values of 2
tσ . Testing the null of linearity (γ = 0) is then equivalent to a test of: 
0''': 3210 === θθθH  
in Equation (3). 
 
We carry out this test for all potential transition variables, i.e. for our six measures of 
global financial stress: the VIX and the MSCI_W for the developed markets, the 
MSCI_EM and the EMBI for the emerging countries, and the two commodity indexes: the 
CRB and the S&P GSCI. If the null of linearity is rejected for more than one potential 
transition variable, we then select the transition variable as the variable with the strongest 
test rejection (i.e. the smallest p-value). 
 
 
                                                 
8. The two regimes are associated with small and large absolute values of the transition function: the transition 
function is U-shaped and symmetric around c, meaning that local dynamics are the same for high and low values 
of the considered series. 
9. Note that, for robustness checks, we have also used the Akaike information criterion, which globally led to 
similar results. 
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• Choice between LSTR and ESTR specification. Once linearity has been rejected, we 
choose between the LSTR and ESTR specifications by implementing the following test 
sequence on Equation (3) (Teräsvirta, 1994):10 
 
0': 304 =θH  
0'0': 3203 == θθH  
0''0': 32102 === θθθH  
 
The rejection of H04 leads to the choice of the LSTR specification. If H04 is accepted and 
H03 is rejected, the ESTR model is selected. Finally, not rejecting H04 and H03, but 
rejecting H02 leads to the LSTR specification.  
 
Once the choice of the nonlinear specification has been made, we estimate the STR model and 
apply various misspecification tests: test of no residual autocorrelation (Teräsvirta, 1998), 
LM-test of no remaining nonlinearity (Eitrheim and Teräsvirta, 1996), and ARCH-LM test 
(Engle, 1982). 
 
2.2. Results 
 
As STR processes involve the estimation of many coefficients, for the sake of brevity, we 
only report the coefficients of our variables of interest, which are the proxies for financial 
market volatility (st), in both the linear and nonlinear regimes and their t-statistics.11
,12 Table 1 
concerns nominal exchange rates series and displays the results of linearity tests for each 
country, together with the estimation of STR models (Equation (1)) and the retained transition 
variable, corresponding to the variable with the strongest linearity test rejection.  
 
Five key findings stand out from Table 1. First, the null hypothesis of linearity is widely 
rejected, as this is the case for 20 out of the 21 countries (first column, Table 1). Moreover, 
for most of these 20 countries, the retained specification is the LSTR one. This is an 
interesting result, putting forward that the low and high volatility regimes are indeed 
characterized by different dynamics.  
                                                 
10. See also Escribano and Jorda (1998) who have proposed a selection procedure to choose between a logistic 
and an exponential specification. 
11. Teräsvirta and Anderson (1992) themselves admitted that it is difficult to interpret all the individual 
coefficients of STR processes.  
12. Complete results are available upon request to the authors. 
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Table 1. Linearity tests and estimation of STR models, 
relationship between exchange rate flexibility and financial stress 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Country Model Number 
of lags 
Linear 
Coefficient 
on st 
Nonlinear  
coefficient on 
st  
Transition 
variable  
Speed of 
adjustment 
Threshold 
 
   β1 β2 st γ c1 c2 
ARS ESTR 3 -0.02 42.44 CRB 64.32 3.32 498.46
   (-0.04) (2.96)     
BRL LSTR 3 -29.20 29.56 CRB 231.03 3.61  
   (-0.89) (0.90)     
CLP LSTR 3 0.17 21.32 VIX 7.22 45.48  
   (1.38) (1.81)     
COP ESTR 1 -10.72 11.14 VIX 97.29 35.79 55.26 
   (-5.01) (5.18)     
MXN Linear        
PEN LSTR 1 0.081 -0.015 CRB 25.29 137.22  
   (3.47) (0)     
UYU ESTR 2 -0.02 0.18 MSCI_EM 36.96 60.61 1532.4
6 
   (-0.80) (1.63)     
VEB LSTR 4 -18.82 18.70 CRB 229.81 6.33  
   (-0.67) (0.69)     
CNY LSTR 2 -0.03 0.03 VIX 38.32 21.09  
   (-2.30) (1.96)     
IDR LSTR 6 -49.23 49.25 EMBI 109.1 0.55  
   (-0.26) (0.26)     
INR ESTR 3 -1.72 1.75 VIX 428.45 27.11 39.66 
   (-2.03) (2.06)     
KRW LSTR 3 -2.06 1.59 EMBI 1082.4 5.29  
   (-0.38) (0.29)     
MYR LSTR 6 0.020 0.001 MSCI_EM 18.08 73.87  
   (0.41) (0.03)     
PHP LSTR 1 1.11 -1.10 MSCI_W 116.64 2.35  
   (0.25) (-0.25)     
SGD ESTR 3 -0.09 0.10 MSCI_EM 33.43 161.78 262.95
   (-0.84) (0.93)     
THB LSTR 3 -0.78 0.75 SP GSCI 105.39 10.13  
   (-0.28) (0.27)     
ILS LSTR 4 0.30 1.87 VIX 1385.91 39.54  
   (2.11) (3.15)     
KWD LSTR 7 0.00 0.14 MSCI_W 203.93 75.84  
   (-1.21) (6.78)     
MAD LSTR 5 -0.37 0.28 EMBI 0.27 14.64  
   (0.00) (5.08)     
RUB LSTR 5 -0.01 26.51 MSCI_W 6.55 112.55  
   (-0.03) (11.40)     
ZAR LSTR 1 -0.10 0.83 CRB 21.19 98.13  
   (-0.52) (3.69)     
 
Note: (i) The currencies are called by their Bloomberg codes, corresponding to the following countries : Argentina (ARS), Brazil (BRL), 
Chile (CLP), Colombia (COP), Mexico (MXN), Peru (PEN), Uruguay (UYU), Venezuela (VEB), China (CNY), India (INR), Indonesia 
(IDR), Korea (KRW), Malaysia (MYR), Philippines (PHP), Singapore (SGD), Thailand (THB), Israel (ILS), Kuwait (KWD), Morocco 
(MAD), Russia (RUB), South Africa (ZAR). MSCI_W is a stock market index of developed countries, MSCI_EM is the same for emerging 
countries; EMBI, the emerging bond global composite index; CRB and SP GSCI are commodity indexes. Values in brackets are the t-
statistics of the estimated coefficients. The number of lags is the order p of the autoregressive part in the STR model. (ii) The transition 
variable is the volatility of the considered index (except for the VIX, which is directly the VIX index). (iii) We estimate the equation: 
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Second, the relationship between the degree of exchange rate flexibility and the global 
financial stress is positive in the nonlinear regime for a majority of countries (Column 4, 
Table 1). It is significantly positive for 10 out of 20 countries. In other words, the exchange 
rate flexibility tends to increase more than proportionally with global financial volatility: 
countries whose currencies are anchored to the USD tend to relax their peg in cases of 
increasing uncertainty on financial markets. There are nevertheless some exceptions; 
particularly some countries such as Malaysia or Venezuela that protect their foreign exchange 
market by tight exchange rate controls. Turning to the relationship between the exchange rate 
flexibility and the global financial stress in the linear regime (Column 3, Table 1), it should be 
noted that it is significantly positive for two countries, namely Peru and Israel. For Israel, the 
global financial volatility variable is more significant in the nonlinear regime than in the 
linear part, while it is only significant in the low-volatility regime for Peru. For the latter, 
there exists a positive link between the Peruvian sol volatility and the commodity index 
volatility which looses it significance during episodes of important financial stress. Regarding 
Mexico, the only country for which the null hypothesis of linearity is not rejected, the 
relationship is positive for all the global financial stress variables except the VIX, but is never 
significant.   
 
Third, the variable which governs the regime change reflects mainly the volatility on 
developed financial markets (8 cases in 20) and that of the commodity prices (6 cases in 20); 
fewer currencies react to the volatility on the emerging financial markets (6 in 20) (Column 5, 
Table 1). Unsurprisingly, the currencies of commodity-producers, such as Argentina, Brazil, 
Peru, Thailand, South Africa, are more exposed when the commodity indexes become more 
volatile. This can be related to the fact that currencies of commodity-exporters generally 
depend on the commodity-terms of trade (Coudert, Couharde and Mignon, 2008). The 
transition variable is mainly the CRB index (5 cases in 6), as it puts more weight on non-fuel 
commodities, which are exported by those countries.  
 
A closer look at the detailed results allows us to somewhat qualify these findings. Indeed, 
results reported in Table 1 are relating to the transition variable for which the rejection of the 
null hypothesis of linearity is the strongest although for some countries, the null of linearity is 
rejected for more than one transition variable. In those cases, we find that (i) the countries 
which are sensitive to the international volatility measured by the VIX, such as India, also 
react when this volatility is proxied by the MSCI_W; (ii) some of the countries whose 
transition variable is the international volatility also react to the volatility on emerging 
markets, this is the case for Russia; (iii) for Israel, the null of linearity is also rejected when 
the CRB and the SPGSCI act as the transition variable, evidencing some impact of the 
commodity prices on this country’s currency. This interesting result shows that the volatility 
of commodity prices is able to affect not only the currencies of commodity-exporters but also 
those of highly dependent countries.     
 
Fourth, the speed of adjustment is quite high in most countries (Column 6, Table 1). This 
means that the exchange rate flexibility rapidly switches from one regime to the other, 
according to the level of global financial stress. A closer look at the results shows that the 
speeds of transition are the highest in the wealthiest countries in the sample, namely Korea, 
Israel and Kuwait. Indeed, a wealthy country is expected to react more rapidly to a high  
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volatility episode, and thus to correct it more quickly,13 suggesting that the transition from the 
high volatility regime to the linear one tends to be rapid. Similarly, such countries are more 
exposed to the international volatility, be it proxied by the volatility on the international stock 
markets or on commodity markets, explaining that the change from the low to the high 
volatility regime may be rapid. Figure 5 illustrates these results by plotting the transition 
function versus the retained transition variable for Israel and Chile. It is shown that the 
transition between the two regimes is quite smooth for Chile, whereas it is clearly abrupt for 
Israel.  
 
Figure 5. Transition function versus transition variable (the VIX) 
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Fifth, the threshold values vary according to both the transition variable and the countries 
(Column 7, Table 1). To see that, let us examine for instance how often these thresholds are 
broken in the case of the VIX index, whose levels are the most familiar, as closely watched by 
market observers. Some currencies like the Indian rupee began to react more strongly as soon 
as the VIX overcomes the threshold of 27, which generally occurs just after the burst of a 
major crisis, such as the 1997 Asian crisis, the 1998 LTCM crisis, the Argentinean crisis in 
2002, and the subprime crisis (see Figure A2 in Appendix). For other countries such as Chile 
and Israel, the regime switches only when the VIX overcomes a threshold around 40, as 
represented on the transition functions above in Figure 5. This situation occurs much more 
rarely, as it was the case in the sample only in the aftermath of the LTCM crisis in late 1998 
and after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in October 2008.   
 
The results for the estimation of Equation (1’), where nominal exchange rates have been 
replaced by real series are displayed in Table A1 in the Appendix. Results are very close, as 
real exchange rate volatility also depends on global financial stress nonlinearly, for all 
countries but one (Brazil). The relationship between the two variables is significantly higher 
in the nonlinear regime for 9 countries. The fact that results in nominal and real terms are 
globally close is not surprising given that the real exchange rate volatility is mainly driven by 
the nominal one, as prices are less volatile than exchange rates. There exists however some 
differences for a few number of countries, particularly for those whose currencies are pegged 
to the USD, and therefore exhibit little nominal flexibility (Kuwait, Colombia...).   
 
Table A2 in the Appendix displays the results for misspecification tests. To avoid too many 
tables, we only report the results for the most interesting models, i.e. models in which the  
                                                 
13. Indeed, one may expect that wealthiest countries have more means than poorest ones to react to disequilibria, 
and are thus able to correct them more quickly. 
  
21
relationship between exchange rate flexibility and global financial stress is significant and has 
the expected sign. The residuals have globally the good properties for Argentina, Chile, 
China, India, Korea, South Africa and Singapore in nominal terms, and for the other countries 
in real terms, with the exception of Peru. 
 
 
3. Regional contagion 
 
We now investigate the potential contagion effects stemming from the other emerging 
currency markets. More specifically, we test for regional contagion as we consider that a 
country is more likely to be submitted to contagion effects coming from its own neighbors 
than from the rest of the world. This hypothesis may be supported by different types of 
reasons: (i) countries may want to stabilize their exchange rates against their trade partners, 
often their neighbors, which incites them to change their exchange rate policy simultaneously; 
(ii) market pressures may be rising simultaneously in a given region because investors are 
prone to suddenly update their beliefs and preferences on a whole region in case of a problem 
somewhere.  
 
3.1. Bringing in the indicator of regional contagion 
 
In this framework, we relate each country i to its geographical zone Gi (Gi = Latin America, 
Asia, Middle East) and construct a contagion indicator, denoted 2itσ , which is equal to the 
average exchange rate volatilities among the other countries j of Gi (with j ≠ i).14 
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We follow the same methodology as in Section 3, paying a special attention to possible 
nonlinear effects. Consequently, we estimate the following specification:  
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Two types of transition variables xt are considered: a proxy of the global financial stress st (as 
in Section 3), and the regional contagion indicator 2itσ . Our aim here is to investigate whether 
the intensity of contagion changes over time and, more specifically, whether its dynamics 
differs across crisis and non-crisis episodes. 
 
3.2. Results 
 
The summarized results relating to the estimation of Equation (5) are reported in Table 2, 
which gives the estimated coefficients of the proxy for contagion 2itσ  in both the linear and 
                                                 
14. Two countries, namely Russia and South Africa, do not belong to the three considered geographical zones. 
For these two countries, the contagion indicator is defined by the average exchange rate volatility of all the other 
countries of our sample (except Russia (resp. South Africa) for South Africa (resp. Russia)). 
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the nonlinear regimes.15  
 
First, the null hypothesis of linearity is rejected for all countries but one (Column 1, Table 2). 
Moreover, the two regimes are governed by different dynamics since the LSTR specification 
is generally retained as for Section 3.  
 
Second, the results show that contagion across countries is more important in high volatility 
regimes (Columns 3 and 4, Table 2). (i) In a majority of countries (11 in 21), the coefficient 
on the contagion indicator is significantly positive in the nonlinear regime, it is even higher 
than that in the linear one (except for one country). (ii) There is no contagion in the linear 
regime, except in six countries (Uruguay, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Kuwait). Out of these six countries, there are only two (Indonesia and the Philippines) for 
which the contagion effect is significant in the linear regime and not in the nonlinear one; for 
the four others, the coefficient of our contagion variable is higher in the nonlinear regime than 
in the linear one. These results confirm the nonlinear effects of contagion, which significantly 
increase in period of turmoil, as evidenced by Forbes and Rigobon (2002). In other words, 
during tranquil periods, the volatility of the exchange rate in a given country is linearly 
affected by that of the neighboring countries, whereas linkages among currency markets do 
increase during crisis periods.  
 
Third, in most of the cases, the transition variable reflects the volatility on international 
financial markets (Column 5, Table 2). This evidences the importance of global financial 
stress in advanced economies on the contagion process. For three countries (Argentina, 
Kuwait, and Russia), the contagion indicator itself acts as the transition variable, meaning that 
contagion tends to operate only above a given threshold.  
 
Finally, as for Section 3, the transition speed is generally high, though varying across 
countries (Column 6, Table 2). In other words, the exchange rate volatility rapidly switches 
from one regime to the other, according either the level of global financial stress or the level 
of contagion; a finding that is consistent with the increasing integration process of world 
financial markets. 
 
The summarized results from the estimation of Equation (5) for real exchange rate series are 
displayed in Table A3 in the Appendix. Here, real series may be more relevant than nominal 
ones when studying contagion since inflation effects are removed, a fact that may be 
important for our panel of countries which are characterized by very different inflation 
regimes. As before, the results are relatively close whether one considers series in nominal or 
in real terms. Indeed, for 13 out of 21 countries, the contagion process is significant in the 
nonlinear regime. The coefficient on contagion is also always higher than in the linear regime, 
except for only two countries (namely Indonesia and the Philippines) as in the nominal case. 
On the whole, our findings illustrate that the main driver of the real exchange rate volatility is 
the nominal one. Table A416 in the Appendix shows that real residual series display no 
autocorrelation at the first lag. In some cases, there is however some remaining nonlinearity, 
which generally disappears for some countries in nominal terms.  
 
 
 
                                                 
15. As for Section 3, complete results are available upon request to the authors. 
16. As before, we only report results relating to the models for which the mean flexibility is significant and 
positive. 
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Table 2. Linearity tests and estimation of STR models, contagion effects 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
   Linear Nonlinear Transition 
variable 
Speed 
of 
adjustm
ent 
Threshold 
Country Model Number 
of lags 
2
itσ  2itσ  st γ c1 c2 
ARS LSTR 3 0.36 -0.25 2
itσ  (a) 470.53 109.61  
   (0.37) (-0.24)     
BRL LSTR 2 -0.16 0.60 MSCI_EM 32.30 20.79  
   (-0.33) (0.65)     
CLP LSTR 3 0.00 3.63 VIX 2.56 47.67  
   (-0.48) (2.92)     
COP LSTR 3 0.00 0.04 SPGSCI 135.43 141.89  
   (0.00) (0.46)     
MXN Linear        
PEN LSTR 1 0.00 0.06 VIX 3568.81 23.89  
   (-0.86) (7.28)     
UYU LSTR 4 0.03 0.98 MSCI_W 273.18 68.75  
   (2.19) (3.13)     
VEB LSTR 4 0.04 1.46 CRB 322.45 6.34  
   (0.06) (1.21)     
CNY LSTR 2 0 0 MSCI_E 62704 66.37  
   (-0.32) (0.05)     
IDR ESTR 2 6.29 -10.22 EMBI 144.76 0.30 31.70 
   (13.16) (-1.29)     
INR ESTR 1 -1.36 1.36 MSCI_W 10.21 100.91 175.11 
   (-0.38) (0.38)     
KRW LSTR 3 0.00 14.14 CRB 698.84 6.72  
   (0.00) (12.92)     
MYR LSTR 7 -0.22 1.01 SPGSCI 14.06 15.33  
   (-1.04) (3.63)     
PHP LSTR 2 0.71 -0.19 SPGSCI 152.98 12.70  
   (3.03) (-0.8)     
SGD LSTR 5 0.06 0.64 MSCI_W 8.08 47.23  
   (7.67) (2.18)     
THB LSTR 2 0.61 8.27 MSCI_W 1627.83 19.43  
   (4.46) (7.50)     
ILS LSTR 1 -0.10 1.42 VIX 82.21 31.98  
   (-0.65) (2.80)     
KWD LSTR 1 0.04 0.62 2
itσ  (a) 31.66 19.29  
   (1.93) (11.19)     
MAD LSTR 5 0.04 0.84 MSCI_W 20.89 78.07  
   (0.43) (1.78)     
RUB ESTR 2 -19.79 19.87 2
itσ  (a) 29.03 13.71  
   (-2.26) (2.27)     
ZAR LSTR 1 -0.02 -0.05 EMBI 3.59 71.28  
   (-0.20) (-0.11)     
 
Note: The following equation is estimated: 
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itσ is the contagion indicator. Explanatory variable: (a): SPGSCI, (b): MSCI_EM. See note (i) of Table 1. 
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Conclusion 
 
Many emerging countries have loosened the link of their currencies to the US dollar since the 
burst of the subprime crisis in July 2007, mainly because they had to face violent market 
pressures, as speculators bid down their currencies. The main relevant explanations may rely 
on contagion effects. For example, investors bearing heavy losses on advanced stock markets 
and lacking liquidity to meet their margin calls or their risk management requirements may 
engage in selling off all sorts of risky assets across the board, including their assets on 
emerging countries in local currencies. Crises are also the times when carry-trades unwind, as 
risk-aversion rises. Incidentally, the rationale to pegging to the dollar could also have been 
wiped off by neighboring countries giving up their peg. 
 
Consequently, exchange rate policies in emerging countries are likely to be contingent on the 
situation of financial markets in advanced countries, spillovers being particularly strong in the 
aftermath of a crisis. To check for this hypothesis, we have tested the links between exchange 
rate policies and financial strains in advanced markets. To do that, we have measured 
exchange rate policies by their degree of flexibility, which in turn is proxied by currency 
volatility; we have assessed the global financial stress by the volatility both on stock markets 
of advanced countries and on commodity markets. The results confirm that the flexibility of 
exchange rates tends to increase more than proportionally with the indicator of global 
financial strains. We have also evidenced nonlinearities in the contagion effects spreading 
from one emerging currency to its neighbors.  
 
According to these results, spillovers from financial turmoil in advanced markets do result in 
the loosening of exchange rate policies in emerging countries. This has been manifest since 
the outset of the subprime crisis, although this does not exclude the possibility that other 
factors have been at work in the renewal of exchange rate arrangements. In this case, the 
situation may not be reversed by the return to normal. In particular, the role of the US dollar 
in the international monetary system has been more and more questioned for several years, 
while the US has kept on accumulating external debt, threatening the long-term value of its 
currency. This could also be another reason for countries to slacken their links to the US 
dollar.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1. Volatility of exchange rates, annualized, in % 
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Note: Volatility figures are cut at a 60% threshold. 
 
Source: Authors calculations, based on Bloomberg data. 
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Figure A2. Volatility of the indicators of global financial markets, annualized, in % 
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Source: Authors calculations, based on Bloomberg data. 
  
31
Table A1. Linearity tests and estimation of STR models, 
relationship between exchange rate flexibility and financial stress, real exchange rates 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Country Model Number 
of lags 
Linear 
coefficient on 
st 
Non-linear  
coefficient on 
st  
Transition 
variable  
Speed of 
adjustme
nt 
Threshold 
 
   β1 β2 st γ c1 c2 
ARS ESTR 2 -31.43 31.45 MSCI_W 102.45 12.92 13.25
   (-1.72) (1.73)     
BRL Linear        
         
CLP LSTR 1 0.22 22.45 VIX 16.19 45.33  
   (1.93) (20.44)     
COP ESTR 3 0.14 -0.03 MSCI_W 20.94 0.74 79.26
   (2.09) (-0.29)     
MXN LSTR 1 0.06 -0.17 EMBI 2386.41 38.59  
   (0.09) (-0.27)     
PEN ESTR 2 -1.72 1.72 SPGSCI 12.42 138.46 138.4
6 
   (-2.45) (2.45)     
UYU LSTR 5 0.02 -0.04 MSCI_W 368.59 68.91  
   (0.24) (-0.44)     
VEB LSTR 4 0.35 -0.45 EMBI 18926 24.36  
   (0.18) (-0.23)     
CNY LSTR 4 0.00 0.03 EMBI 53.89 63.52  
   (-0.29) (1.96)     
IDR LSTR 1 8.15 -7.16 VIX 4366 21.77  
   (1.48) (-1.16)     
INR LSTR 1 0.01 0.70 SPGSCI 3.77 301.89  
   (1.0) (2.49)     
KRW LSTR 7 5.43 -5.20 MSCI_W 4402.10 2.69  
   (1.08) (-1.04)     
MYR LSTR 1 0.01 -0.005 MSCI_E 10.40 81.93  
   (0.26) (-0.09)     
PHP LSTR 3 -0.86 0.89 MSCI_W 118.05 2.36  
   (-0.25) (0.26)     
SGD ESTR 2 -0.22 0.22 MSCI_E 71.77 189.94 751.9
7 
   (-4.22) (4.35)     
THB LSTR 3 -0.70 0.67 SPGSCI 120.79 11.16  
   (-0.42) (0.41)     
ILS LSTR 1 0.38 1.51 VIX 12.14 32.11  
   (2.79) (3.56)     
KWD ESTR 2 0.04 -0.04 CRB 34.44 61.16 339.2
   (0.59) (-0.59)     
MAD LSTR 3 -0.11 0.16 CRB 35217.27 25.12  
   (-1.31) (1.90)     
RUB LSTR 6 -0.04 84.02 MSCI_W 76.07 81.07  
   (-0.37) (3.65)     
ZAR LSTR 1 0.13 -0.15 EMBI 190.0 59.42  
   (0.66) (-0.74)     
 
Note: This table reports the results of the estimation of Equation (1’). See notes (i) and (ii) of Table 1. 
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Table A2. Residual tests 
(relationship between exchange rate flexibility and financial stress), p-values 
 
 No autocorrelation   
 Order 1 Order 4 
No remaining 
nonlinearity ARCH 
Nominal series 
ARG 0.29 0.85 0.83 1.00 
CHL 0.94 0.48 0.07 0.49 
COL 0.32 0.05 0.00 0.02 
PER 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CHN 0.57 0.40 0.59 1.00 
IND 0.50 0.80 0.43 0.91 
SGP 0.28 0.47 0.00 0.00 
ISR 0.02 0.01 0.46 1.00 
KUW 0.82 0.66 1.00 0.01 
MOR 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.00 
RUS 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SAF 0.67 0.47 0.90 1.00 
Real series 
ARG 0.05 0.19 0.05 1.00 
CHL 0.23 0.00 0.63 0.00 
COL 0.92 0.22 0.17 1.00 
PER 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CHN 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
IND 0.61 0.40 0.37 0.95 
SGP 0.25 0.09 0.04 0.01 
ISR 0.81 0.15 0.46 0.25 
MOR 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.22 
RUS 0.42 0.14 0.00 0.20 
 
Note: This table presents the results of residual tests (p-values). No autocorrelation refers to the test of no residual autocorrelation of order 1 
and 4 described in Teräsvirta (1998). No remaining nonlinearity is the LM-test of no additive nonlinearity developed by Eitrheim and 
Teräsvirta (1996). ARCH is the ARCH-LM test of homoskedasticity against the alternative of conditional heteroskedasticity (Engle, 1982). 
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Table A3. Linearity tests and estimation of STR models, 
contagion effects, real exchange rates 
 
Countr
y 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
   Linear Non 
linear 
Transition 
variable  
Speed of 
adjustment
Threshold 
Countr
y 
Model Number 
of lags 
2
itσ  2itσ  st γ c1 c2 
ARS ESTR 1 -0.09 0.02 SPGSCI 19765 19.74 195.72 
   (-0.35) (0.07)     
BRL Linear        
CLP LSTR 3 0.01 3.19 VIX 3.05 45.79  
   (0.43) (2.66)     
COP LSTR 7 -0.02 0.87 VIX 796.33 31.57  
   (-0.62) (5.24)     
MXN Linear        
PEN ESTR 2 -0.28 0.30 MSCI_W 1.31 84.11 357.33 
   (-2.81) (3.02)     
UYU LSTR 6 0.05 0.58 MSCI_W 66.32 67.22  
   (1.59) (2.17)     
VEB LSTR 4 -0.29 0.82 VIX 176.26 16.89  
   (-0.37) (0.88)     
CNY LSTR 3 0.00 0.18 EMBI 256.07 60.45  
   (-0.41) (2.27)     
IDR LSTR 3 6.78 11.89 MSCI_W 16.16 29.93  
   (6.21) (2.47)     
INR LSTR 1 0.02 0.50 SPGSCI 3.90 299.6
3 
 
   (2.0) (0.05)     
KRW LSTR 2 0.19 2.55 CRB 571.65 6.50  
   (0.35) (3.27)     
MYR LSTR 6 0.25 0.46 CRB 61.34 4.05  
   (1.45) (2.37)     
PHP LSTR 2 0.61 0.14 EMBI 4.01 48.22  
   (2.93) (0.39)     
SGD LSTR 5 0.11 0.68 MSCI_W 7.68 54.86  
   (7.68) (2.31)     
THB LSTR 1 1.72 2.74 2
itσ  (b) 108.93 50.09  
   (3.49) (4.12)     
ILS LSTR 2 0.06 2.73 MSCI_W 1170.16 53.04  
   (0.45) (2.84)     
KWD ESTR 3 -1.24 1.25 2
itσ  (a) 609.35 7.85 13.55 
   (-1.71) (1.72)     
MAD LSTR 2 -0.02 1.82 SPGSCI 1235.74 103.6
9 
 
   (-0.15) (2.37)     
RUB ESTR 2 -48.21 48.14 MSCI_D 15.57 81.0 362.15 
   (-0.29) (0.29)     
ZAR LSTR 1 0.03 2.01 EMBI 174.90 59.39  
   (0.18) (1.55)     
Note: See Table 2. 
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Table A4. Residual tests (contagion effects), p-values 
 
 No autocorrelation   
 Order 1 Order 4 
No remaining 
nonlinearity ARCH 
Nominal series 
CHL 0.99 0.25 0.26 0.43 
PER 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.15 
URU 0.01 0.05 0.00 1.00 
IDN 0.01 0.02 0.18 0.45 
KOR 0.14 0.19 0.00 0.98 
MLY 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.01 
PHI 0.76 0.94 0.40 1.00 
SGP 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 
THA 0.25 0.06 0.93 1.00 
EGY 0.03 0.15 0.00 1.00 
ISR 0.01 0.09 0.26 1.00 
KUW 0.27 0.70 0.58 0.01 
MOR 0.66 0.00 0.21 0.00 
RUS 0.46 0.19 1.00 1.00 
Real series 
CHL 0.75 0.23 0.32 0.01 
COL 0.43 0.05 0.53 0.68 
PER 0.69 0.01 0.74 0.00 
URU 0.08 0.21 0.00 1.00 
CHN 0.71 0.02 0.61 0.00 
IDN 0.23 0.06 0.01 0.96 
IND 0.65 0.44 0.39 0.97 
KOR 0.82 0.97 0.00 0.00 
MLY 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.40 
PHI 0.17 0.01 0.57 1.00 
SGP 0.21 0.22 0.01 0.87 
THA 0.83 0.02 0.01 1.00 
ISR 0.36 0.16 0.00 0.32 
KUW 0.57 0.12 0.08 0.07 
MOR 0.50 0.09 0.55 0.09 
SAF 0.83 0.11 0.53 0.62 
Note: This table presents the results of residual tests (p-values). No autocorrelation refers to the test of no residual autocorrelation of order 1 
and 4 described in Teräsvirta (1998). No remaining nonlinearity is the LM-test of no additive nonlinearity developed by Eitrheim and 
Teräsvirta (1996). ARCH is the ARCH-LM test of homoskedasticity against the alternative of conditional heteroskedasticity (Engle, 1982). 
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